Sunday, October 31, 2010

Hedging against FII outflow driven market correction

Considering that there seems a general consensus regarding the source of the currency rally in Indian equity markets, one would wonder how sustainable it is. Further quantitative easing in US may push things even further up. What can one do to hedge against an FII outflow driven market correction in Indian equity?

Today's business standard has an interesting article on a related topic. It contains an interesting idea. One can short Rupee in the currency futures markets to hedge against a sharp pullout of FIIs from Indian markets. Of course the cost of this is that the gains driven by FII inflows will get dampened somewhat by the losses on the futures side since Rupee will continue to appreciate in that case. However, considering potential RBI intervention in forex markets to keep Rupee from appreciating too much may work in favor of this strategy. On the other hand a sudden pullout by FIIs will certainly push Rupee down. The gains from that will partially offset the losses in the equity portfolio.

Why not simply buy a put on the index? For one it would be costlier. For two, it does not address the specific issue of volatility of FII inflows. A dollar rupee futures contract does just that. One can even use an option - out of the money call on Rupee (or put of Dollar) - as an alternative. In this case the upside from further FII inflows remains fully untouched in return for the option premium. This is best done in one or two month one off cases. For a regular hedge futures are likely to be more effective.

A multi-asset portfolio can also benefit from the above. Bonds are affected by the FII flows as well - albeit to a lesser extent. Gold of course is an entirely different topic. More on that later!

Sunday, September 26, 2010

Cheap money at the gates!

Indian equity markets have staged an impressive rally in the past couple of weeks. One major reason for this was the rather subdued growth in equity markets in last 6 months after the initial recovery. Once the markets caught up to the fundamentals (and probably went a little further), suddenly everyone seemed to be looking around for reasons to justify higher levels. There were not many and that showed in the range bound markets for last 6 months.

Interestingly nothing major has happened in the last month either. Domestically that is. Of course the monetary policy stance is becoming less aggressive, inflation is waning, IIP is rising and GDP forecasts are getting better. But none of this is 'news' and to that extent has largely been factored in the markets. The real change in my view is on the foreign investors' front. Many investors in the developed economies seem to be over their fears now and are back into the hunt for returns. The other thing that works in India's favor is the a robust economic growth through the crisis and absence of any obvious signs of bubble (unlike China). Thus the cheap money is at our gates again!

Is it a problem? Not now, not necessarily in future either. But it can be worrying for us in two ways. For one, the returns that foreign investors are willing to settle for are lesser than what we may demand as investors standalone. This forces domestic investors to also settle for the same returns or lead to inflated asset values. Secondly, the return of this money in troubled times rocks our asset markets more than they deserve to on the back of their performance. This is simply the "curse of shallow but attractive asset markets". We will continue to have it till the size of our economy and asset markets grows to a few times its current level (at current growth rate, maybe another 10 years).

What do we watch out for? There is no easy way to make money by second guessing FIIs. A more realistic strategy would be to avoid making losses due to their behavior. That means avoiding entering markets in a euphoria driven by non-domestic factors (US employment data, good results of stress tests in EU etc) and more importantly avoiding booking losses in a fall driven by FII exit due to non-domestic factors. Summary: let the investors be domestic or foreign, make your decisions domestic!

Sunday, September 05, 2010

Book review - When Genius Failed

This book on the LTCM debacle is by no means either new or contemporary. I just happened to dig it out from Landmark one evening and finished reading it today.

LTCM i.e. Long Term Capital Management, was a hedge fund promoted by a clutch of bond traders on Wall Street along with a few academicians (including Scholes and Merton of Black-Scholes-Merton fame). At its peak it had equity capital of more than $ 4 bn and assets of more than $ 100 bn.

The book covers the rise and fall of LTCM in great detail - in a very human rather than analytical way. It is written for lay persons and that shows. A good read for lay persons for sure, but also for the practitioners of modern finance, all the more so in emerging economies like India's. It is not implausible to expect an LTCM like debacle in India within next 5 years. As the complexity of the financial system grows, crises of LTCM variety are more and more likely to occur.

So what exactly happened? LTCM started out as purely a bond arbitrage portfolio with $ 1.5 bn in capital. It borrowed about 25 times that and invested in bonds of various types. It was not a directional bet on the bond prices though. It dealt in what is called convergence trades i.e. narrowing of spreads between two bonds. For whatever reasons if the spreads between two bonds are out of whac with the usual levels, an opportunity to make relatively low risk return arises. One needs to short the costlier bond and long the cheaper one. Over time, as the spreads do narrow, one squares off both the positions and makes a tidy profit. This is market neutral trade since absolute price levels of either of the two positions is not relevant for the profit and loss of the trade. Only the spreads matter.

LTCM did good business in first four years of its operation. However, its success prompted many others to enter the bond arbitrage business. This put the firm in a quandary. It was getting more investors but fewer opportunities. The firm reacted by diversifying into newer areas of convergence trade - including merger arbitrage, volatility spreads and so on. This however was a much more tricky turf than bond arbitrage. Owing to a blind faith in the validity of their lognormal price models and a financial storm precipitated by the Russian bond default of the 1998, LTCM found that the spreads in most of its trades were diverging rather than converging. Owing to its excessive leverage, this proved to be far too much for it to handle. The fund had to be rescued by a consortium of investment banks.

The efficient market hypothesis has turned out to be more a neat modeling tool rather than reliable predictive framework. The book repeatedly refers to fat tails and the ridiculous implicit expectation in normal distribution models that events of 1998 should occur no more than once in the lifetime of the universe! In reality, such events happen once in 25-50 years; and are occuring more frequently in recent decades.

An interesting meta-inference i could draw was as follows. The accuracy of the efficient market hypothesis itself is a market dependent variable. Think of it as the volatility of the volatility. During normal times, the normal distribution (no pun intended) holds much more accurately than during turbulent times. I recall my lessons as an aerospace engineer. In fluid mechanics we always specified whether our models were dealing with laminar flow or turbulent flow (when you open a tap just a little, its water stream is laminar, if you open it fully and the water pressure is good, it becomes turbulent). The models, one would guess, differed significantly. Something similar should apply to the financial world as well. The laminar models are already in place. The turbulent ones need to be developed. (Jump diffusion for option pricing is an interesting start.)